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Measuring Fiscal Stance 2009-2012 
 
Ide Kearney1 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the period since mid-2008 the Irish government has introduced a series of 
austerity measures equivalent to approximately 15 per cent of GDP. These 
measures were taken to try and reverse the deterioration in the government 
deficit that began in 2008. It is never a straightforward exercise to assess the 
outcome of such a package of discrete policy changes on the public finances. It is 
made more difficult in circumstances where the economy is going through a 
precipitous collapse in output and employment as occurred in Ireland between 
2008 and 2011. This collapse caused a dramatic decline in taxation revenues and 
an increase in unemployment-related expenditures, both of which serve to 
worsen the public finance position. In such circumstances, it is important to 
disentangle the effect of policy decisions (e.g. higher tax rates or lower transfer 
payments) which affect the discretionary fiscal position from those changes 
which are driven by the collapse in the economy.  
 
To address this issue we look at the fiscal stance adopted in individual budgets 
over the period 2008-2012 in this paper. The fiscal stance indicator we use is an 
attempt to isolate for each year discretionary changes in the budget balance from 
the total budget balance. In effect it looks at the difference between the actual 
budget outcome and the outcome that would have arisen assuming no change in 
policy, an “indexed” budget.  
 
We estimate an indexed budget using a set of detailed indexation rules which are 
included in the ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model. Using these rules, we 
simulate the HERMES model in successive years to estimate the budget balance 
that would have pertained in the absence of any discretionary budgetary changes 
in that year. The difference between the actual budget balance and this indexed 
budget is a measure of fiscal stance.  
 
We examine budgetary outcomes for each of the years since the onset of the 
fiscal and banking crisis in Ireland in 2008. Over the years 2009-2012 our results 
suggest that the cumulative effect of discretionary fiscal policy has been to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  I would like to thank Adele Bergin, David Duffy, Joe Durkan, John FitzGerald, Petra Gerlach, Diarmaid Smyth, two 
anonymous referees and participants at an internal ESRI seminar for comments on an earlier draft of this article. I 
would further like to thank Patrick Quill of the Department of Finance for advice on collating the 2011 and 2012 
budgetary data. 
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reduce the deficit by 5½ percentage points of GDP. Our results suggest that the 
impact of the very large package of measures introduced in 2009 was very 
modest. This was partly due to the very rapid deflation that occurred in 2009, our 
estimates suggest that this deflation served to  more than offset the nominal 
current expenditure cuts that were introduced in that budget. In 2010 and 2011 
the impact of fiscal policy has been much more marked, knocking between 1 ½ 
and 2 percentage points of GDP off the deficit in each year. We estimate that the 
effects of the 2012 Budget could also reduce the deficit by 1 ¾ percentage points 
of GDP. 
 
Looking further back to the last major crisis in the public finances in the 1980s, 
the estimates we present here suggest that the effect of the current fiscal 
consolidation for the years 2009-2012 has been much deeper than the fiscal 
consolidation in the period 1982-1986. In both periods, austerity measures were 
introduced against a backdrop of low or negative growth and rapidly rising 
unemployment.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the public finance 
position. In Section 3 we outline the methodology used to estimate the fiscal 
stance using the ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model. In Section 4 we present 
our estimates of the fiscal stance for each of the years 2008-2012. Section 5 
discusses the results. 
 
2. The Actual Budget Balance 2008-2012 
The Irish economy went into freefall in 2008, with output, income and prices 
collapsing. By 2011 GDP in current prices had fallen 16 per cent from its 2007 
peak, while GNP in current prices had fallen by almost one-quarter. The deep 
recession affected both output levels and prices. This caused a massive erosion of 
the tax base with a consequent collapse in government revenue. The heavy 
reliance on property-related taxes in the years preceding the collapse further 
exacerbated this, and exposed the narrowness of the tax base. Furthermore, the 
crisis led to a 15 per cent fall in the level of employment, which in addition to 
eroding the tax base, added to unemployment-related expenditures (transfer 
payments). 
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FIGURE 1  The Collapse in GDP, GNP and Employment 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
The government accounts were broadly in balance in 2007. However this masked 
the deep structural weakness in the underlying fiscal position that was revealed 
once the housing and banking crisis began. The gap between revenue and 
expenditure widened to a peak of almost €18.5 billion2 in 2009 with the 
underlying deficit as a share of GDP reaching almost 12 per cent (Figure 2). It 
narrowed slightly to €17 billion in 2010, however, given that GDP was also falling, 
its share of GDP barely changed. In 2011 the deficit fell to €14 billion or 9 per cent 
of GDP, and it is projected to narrow to €13 billion in 2012.   
 
FIGURE 2  General Government Deficit Net of Transfers to Banks 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Excluding transfers to the banks.  
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Figure 3 shows the path of government expenditure and revenue since 2005.3 It 
was in the years preceding 2007 that the property bubble and credit bubble were 
allowed to inflate (Bergin et al. 2011), with government revenues booming. In 
2008 both bubbles burst and the public finance and bank funding crises emerged.   
Figure 1 shows the speed with which general government revenue collapsed from 
2007 onwards, with total government revenue one-quarter or €16 billion lower in 
2010 compared to 2007. By the end of 2012, after five years of fiscal 
consolidation, total tax revenue is forecast to be €13 billion lower than in 2007. It 
is this collapse in tax revenues, and in particular property-related taxes, which is 
the proximate cause of the public finance crisis in Ireland.  
 
FIGURE 3  General Government Expenditure and Revenue, €billion 
 
 
 
 
On the expenditure side, total government expenditure continued to increase in 
2008 despite the crisis in revenues, rising by over €7 billion. From 2008 onwards 
total expenditure, excluding the cumulative €41 billion in monies transferred to 
the banks,4 has been falling and is projected to return to 2007 levels by 2012. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  In this note we use detailed data for general government revenue and expenditure from the National Income and 
Expenditure 2011, Tables 19-25. For 2012 we use numbers supplied by the Department of Finance which are based on 
the Stability Programme Update, Department of Finance April 2012. This provides the most recent estimates for the 
official forecasts/targets for 2012 (2012 figures have an asterix to indicate forecast). See Appendix 2 for details. 
4  By the end of 2011 the government had made direct transfers of almost €63 billion to the banking sector. This 
consisted of €34.7 billion provided to Anglo Irish Bank and INBS (IBRC) by way of promissory notes issued by the 
exchequer. A further €28 billion was provided by the NPRF and the exchequer consisting of €20.8 billion to AIB and 
EBS, €4.7 billion to Bank of Ireland and €2.7billion to ILP. At the time of writing, €5.8 billion of these bank 
recapitalisation monies are being treated as a capital transfer in the national accounts, and are included in the 2011 
general government expenditure figures in Figure 2. The €31billion promissory note payment to IBRC in 2010 and the 
€4 billion exchequer payment in 2009 were already included in the general government expenditure figures in the 
national accounts in both these years. The total figure for capital transfers to the banks which is included in general 
government expenditure is thus €41 billion.  
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However the composition of total expenditure has changed significantly over that 
period, shifting from expenditure on goods and services (including capital 
expenditure) to transfer payments (see Table 1). Expenditure on current goods 
and services and capital expenditure are projected to have fallen by €8.8 billion 
between 2007 and 2012, while transfer payments are forecast to have increased 
by €9.0 billion, €4.5 billion related to personal transfer payments (unemployment 
benefit, pensions, other social welfare payments) and €4.5 billion of which relates 
to an increase in national debt interest payments to service the explosion in 
government debt.5 
 
TABLE 1 Government Revenue and Expenditure 2007-2012 
 
Change 2007-2012 €bn 
Taxes on income and wealth -3.0 Expenditure:  -9.0 
Taxes on expenditure  -6.8 Capital Expenditure -6.4  
Taxes on capital   -2.4 Current goods and services   -2.4  
Other receipts -1.0 Subsidies  -0.2  
   Transfer payments:  9.0 
   National debt interest 4.5  
   Other 4.5  
Total government receipts -13.2 Total expenditure  0.0 
General Government Balance -13.0 % of 2012 GDP  8% 
 
 
3. Methodology 
The actual budget balance reflects both cyclical developments and discretionary 
budgetary decisions. Fluctuations in economic activity significantly affect budget 
receipts and expenditure. During expansions tax receipts increase while some 
expenditures, such as unemployment benefits, decline and the reverse occurs in 
recessions. The movements in these budgetary categories are referred to as 
“automatic stabilisers” that operate to offset the effects of the economic cycle 
and lead to counter-cyclical movements in aggregate demand in the absence of 
any discretionary changes by the fiscal authorities.  
 
However, the collapse in the economy that occurred between 2008 and 2011 is 
far from a “cyclical” event or a fluctuation in economic activity. The bursting of 
the housing and credit bubbles, and the collapse in economic activity, prices and 
employment, exposed a structural weakness in the public finances which swiftly 
led to double digit deficit ratios. Within the maelstrom of this collapse in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  See FitzGerald and Kearney (2011) for details. 
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public finances, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of policy on the widening 
deficit.  
 
The fiscal stance indicator is an attempt to capture in a single indicator the 
combined macroeconomic effects of all the various decisions taken in a budget in 
respect of public expenditure and taxation. The macroeconomic impact of a 
government’s budget is typically judged on whether the fiscal stance is 
considered to be expansionary or contractionary in terms of either boosting or 
dampening aggregate demand in the domestic economy.   
 
3.1 The HERMES Measure of Fiscal Stance 
Our method of estimating fiscal stance is to use a macroeconomic model (the 
ESRI-HERMES model) to simulate the effects of an indexed budget, where 
indexation is based on assuming no policy change relative to the previous year’s 
budget. The difference between the indexed budget balance and the actual 
budget balance is then a measure of fiscal stance. A positive (negative) difference 
indicates a loosening (tightening) of fiscal policy. This is based on an incremental 
approach and so can be cumulated over time. Using a macroeconomic model for 
estimation allows for the implementation of detailed indexation rules for 
different items of revenue and expenditure.  
 
Effectively, the indexed budget is intended to simulate a “what if there were no 
policy changes” budget relative to the previous year. In practice average tax rates 
and average expenditure rates are held unchanged relative to the previous year, 
where detailed indexation rules are used for individual tax and expenditure 
items. Appendices 3 and 4 give details on the indexation rules employed.  We 
then compare this “indexed” outcome with the actual outturn in each year. The 
difference between the indexed and actual outcome provides an estimate of the 
fiscal stance.  
 
The full indexed budget is computed assuming no change in average tax and 
expenditure rates from the previous year, and applying the actual growth rate to 
the revenue and expenditure base. The use of average tax and expenditure rates 
ensures full indexation of the tax and welfare system. There is one exception to 
these indexation rules. Indexation of non-cyclical expenditure assumes it grows at 
its “long-run” growth rate which we implement as a nine-year average growth 
rate. This is intended to capture a measure of indexation that is neutral with 
respect to the cycle. 
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The derivation of an indexed budget using the HERMES macroeconomic model 
can be illustrated in a simplified example as follows. Define T as total revenue, 
GTR as cyclical expenditure (transfers) and GO as non-cyclical expenditure, then 
the actual budget balance B in year t is: 
tt GOGTR −−= tt T    B  
 
Define t as the average tax rate (T/Y), rtr as the average rate of cyclical 
expenditure (GC/Y), rgo as the average rate of non-cyclical expenditure (GO/Y). 
Then the budget balance can be expressed as a function of average tax and 
expenditure rates, which are discretionary policy instruments, times the base Y, 
where the base is determined by the rate of economic growth: 
ttttt YrgoYrtrY −−= tt   t  B  
 
Now define zt as the actual growth rate of Y in year t and z* as the “long-run” 
growth rate in non-cyclical expenditure. The budget balance indexed on the 
previous year’s budget is then:  
tttttttt zYrgozYrtrzY
*
111111-tt ...  t  B
~
−−−−− −−=  
where zt . Yt-1 =Yt.  With some manipulation this can be derived as: 
tttt Yz
zrgorgortr .).(t -   B-B~
*
1ttt 





−−∆−∆= −
 
 
From the formula we can see that increases in average tax rates will tighten fiscal 
stance while increases in average transfer rates will loosen fiscal stance. The last 
term implies that if non-cyclical expenditure grows faster than its long-run 
growth rate, this will loosen fiscal stance.6  
 
3.1.1 Tax Indexation Rules 
The main tax revenues are determined as the product of a tax “rate” by a “tax 
base”:  
ititit BASE .   t  T =  
 
For the purposes of indexation, there are detailed separate revenue categories 
identified. These include expenditure taxes (VAT receipts, customs taxes, excise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  This can be seen by rewriting this third term as follows: 
t
tt
tt Y
zGG
z
zrgorgo '.'. 11 −−
−
=−  
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taxes, agricultural levies, motor vehicle duties, etc.) and income taxes (personal 
income taxes, social security contributions, corporate income taxes, DIRT taxes, 
agricultural income taxes, etc.). Appendix 3 and 4 give the detailed indexation 
rules applied for each category of revenue. Typically indexation to the previous 
year’s budget is implemented by setting the tax rate equal to that of the previous 
year, as follows: 
it1-itit BASE .   t  T
~
=  
 
There are some exceptions to this rule built in to the model to ensure accurate 
indexation. For example, the rate of excise duty is indexed to the deflator of 
private consumption because excise duties are levied on volumes.  
 
3.1.2 Expenditure Indexation Rules 
The indexation of expenditure items is more complicated because not all items of 
expenditure are cyclical. For cyclical items the indexation rules used can be 
summarised as follows: 
Unemployment transfers, GTRU, are modelled as the product of an 
unemployment transfer “rate” ru, applied to the “base” of total numbers 
unemployed, U: 
ttt  U. ru    GTRU =  
 
Because numbers employed is a volume base, the rate must be indexed to the 
appropriate price. In the HERMES model indexation of the rate of transfer 
payments uses a weighted average of the private consumption deflator and the 
average wage rate as the price term:  
ittt1-tt  U. )W)-(1P.(ru    
~~~~
 αα +=URTG  
 
Indexation of other personal transfers applies a similar price adjustment. In 
addition, because these transfers are mainly to the elderly (pensions) and the 
young (children’s allowance) there is a volume adjustment based on the growth 
in the dependency rate (the proportion of the population over 65 and under 14 
years of age).  
 
Indexation of subsidy payments imposes a growth rate equal to the growth in the 
relevant subsidy base. For example, agricultural subsidies are assumed to grow at 
the same rate as agricultural output. 
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For non-cyclical expenditure items, we assume no volume growth as a pure 
indexation rule. Indexed values of four categories of public investment, two 
categories of employment and public consumption were all computed on this 
basis.7 In normal times such an indexation rule would be deflationary8, however 
given the collapse in the economy, this no growth rule could in itself be regarded 
as having an expansionary bias in the years 2009 and 2010. To the extent that this 
is the case, our estimate of the fiscal stance in those years will in effect overstate 
the contractionary effect of fiscal policy. On balance we considered that a long-
run no-growth indexation rule was the best approximation for a realistic no policy 
change stance over the period in question. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Official Austerity Package 2008-2012 
In July 2008 the authorities began a policy of corrective action (see Appendix 2 
for details) to help control the burgeoning deficit. Official estimates suggest that 
€24 billion in discretionary budgetary measures have been implemented since 
mid-2008. This is equivalent to 15 per cent of 2011 GDP or 19 per cent of 2011 
GNP. These are nominal amounts which state the ex ante policy position, that is 
to say that they do not take account of the negative effects on employment, 
output and prices which reductions in expenditure and increases in taxation have 
on economic activity.  
 
TABLE 2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Estimates of Austerity, €billion 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2009-
2012 
Estimated Ex Ante Measures Announced since mid-July 2008, €bn. 
Revenue 0.0 -5.6 0.0 -1.4 -1.6 -8.6 
Expenditure -1.0 -3.9 -4.3 -3.9 -2.2 -14.3 
of which capital: 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.9 -0.8 -4.2 
Total -1.0 -9.4 -4.3 -5.3 -3.8 -22.9 
% of GDP -0.6% -5.9% -2.7% -3.4% -2.4%  
Estimated Ex Post Effects of budgetary policy, €bn. 
Revenue 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.9 -2.7 
Expenditure 2.0 -0.3 -2.4 -1.5 -2.0 -6.2 
of which capital: 0.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.3 -0.8 -3.7 
Total 2.4 -0.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.9 -8.8 
% of GDP 1.3% -0.4% -1.9% -1.5% -1.8%  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  These are investment in public administration, health and education, local authority housing and roads, water supply 
and sewerage; employment in public administration, and health and education; and government's purchases of 
goods and services. See Appendix 3 and 4 for details. 
8 In Kearney et al. (2000) and Barrett et al. (2009) we used a long-run volume growth rate, estimated using a nine-
period centred moving average as an indexation rule. 
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Our estimates of the fiscal stance suggest that the cumulative effect of the fiscal 
consolidation package 2009-2012 (excluding 2008 because it only partially covers 
the fiscal consolidation period) is estimated to be €8.8 billion for a package of €23 
billion, just over one-third.9 This is on the low side, typically we would expect the 
ex post outturn to be roughly half the original ex ante measure. This anomaly can 
be traced to the 2009 Budget which had a rather perverse outcome. Our results 
suggest that in 2009 ex ante current expenditure measures of €3.6 billion 
introduced in the budget had an ex post stimulatory effect equivalent to €1 
billion. This highlights the difficulty of introducing austerity measures at a time of 
significant deflation.  
 
4.2 Individual Year Estimates of the Fiscal Stance 2008-2012 
Figure 4 shows the overall measure of fiscal stance based on the difference 
between an indexed and actual budget balance (GGB). A positive result implies an 
expansionary budget, a negative sign indicates a contractionary budget. 
 
FIGURE 4 Estimate of Fiscal Stance 
 
 
 
The results are interesting and instructive. At a first glance they suggest that it 
was not until 2010 that fiscal policy measures adopted began to have a significant 
impact on the deficit.  
 
2008: We estimate a strongly stimulatory budgetary stance of 1.3 per cent of 
GDP. This is not a surprising result. The policy of fiscal consolidation began in July 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9  In comparing with the ex ante position we compare full-year effects. Indexation assumes policy changes are 
implemented as a full year effect, including all carryover effects. 
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2008 when the government introduced a package of cuts equivalent to €1 billion 
on a full-year basis. However, this was only a small part of the overall budgetary 
measures introduced in 2008, all of which are captured in the HERMES indexed 
budget.  
 
2009: We estimate a mildly contractionary budgetary stance of -0.4 per cent of 
GDP. This is at first glance a very surprising result; given that the announced 
package of cuts is estimated to have been equivalent to almost 6 per cent of GDP. 
However, this occurred in the year when the economy was in freefall, and prices 
of consumer and investment goods both fell sharply. It points to the difficulties of 
implementing austerity cuts in a period of deflation.10 This means that a policy of 
no change in nominal expenditure levels, which in “normal” times would imply a 
discretionary tightening of policy, in 2009 would on average have led to a real 
increase in expenditure.  Our estimate of the fiscal stance for 2009 suggests that 
current expenditure had a stimulatory effect on the economy equivalent to 0.6 
per cent of GDP (Figure 4). 
 
2010: We estimate a highly contractionary budgetary stance of 1.9 per cent of 
GDP. This is lower than the announced package of €4.3 billion (2.7 per cent of 
GDP) however, allowing for the negative effects of austerity on growth and 
employment, and against a backdrop of continued deflation, this estimate looks 
consistent with the ex ante numbers. 
 
2011: We estimate a strongly contractionary budgetary stance of 1.5 per cent of 
GDP. Again this is lower than the ex ante package of €5.3 billion or 3.4 per cent of 
GDP.  
 
2012: We estimate a contractionary budgetary stance of 1.8 per cent of GDP. 
These figures are based on the latest official forecasts of the general government 
deficit from the Stability Programme Update, April 2012.  
 
Figure 5 breaks down the composition of the fiscal stance measure among the 
main categories of expenditure. Scanning across the graph it is clear that changes 
in current expenditure have been the most discretionary element of recent 
budgetary policy. What is most noticeable is had current expenditure been fully 
indexed in 2009, the fiscal stance would have been significantly more 
contractionary than the actual outcome.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10  For example during 2009 consumer prices as measured by the private consumption deflator fell by 7 per cent. 
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FIGURE 5 Composition of Fiscal Stance 
 
 
 
4.3 Comparison with Other Measures of Fiscal Stance 
The standard approach is to estimate a cyclically adjusted or “structural” budget 
balance. This is referred to as the “gaps and elasticities” approach that involves 
estimating an output gap measure and then using this along with elasticity 
measures to adjust budgetary items. This measure is defined as what the budget 
balance would be were the economy operating at capacity, where capacity is 
typically defined as full employment output or trend output. Many international 
institutions, including the OECD, the European Commission and the IMF produce 
estimates of cyclically adjusted budget balances based on this definition. 
 
Even in normal times there are a number of difficulties in interpreting the 
structural budget balance as an indicator of fiscal stance. First, there are 
methodological difficulties surrounding the definition and measurement of 
capacity output to generate the gap measure and the underlying elasticities in 
the measures favoured by the international agencies. These difficulties are 
significantly exacerbated following the sort of collapse in the economy that 
Ireland has just witnessed. Second, the structural budget balance (SBB) measures 
the total effects of discretionary policy, which is a cumulative measure, and does 
not measure the impact of the current year’s budget relative to the previous 
year’s budget. Because of these difficulties many institutions now use the change 
in the SBB as a measure of fiscal stance, which is an incremental measure. If the 
SBB increases (decreases) in a given year, this would imply a tightening 
(loosening) of fiscal policy in that year’s budget. To arrive at an estimate of the 
total stance of discretionary fiscal policy over a number of years, these changes 
can be aggregated over time.  
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Figure 6 shows the estimated fiscal stance from HERMES together with estimates 
of changes in the structural budget balance (SBB) from the Department of 
Finance budget book, which are based on European Commission estimates, and 
the September 2012 IMF estimates. The Budget Book estimate shown here is the 
change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance or the structural budget balance 
published in successive budget book publications.11  
 
The differences in individual years are striking. In 2009 all three measures agree 
that the very large package of measures introduced in that year had virtually no 
effect on the deficit. Similarly, all three measures are close in their assessment of 
the 2011 Budget, with the IMF estimating a reduction in the structural balance of 
2.3 per cent of GDP compared to a Budget Book estimate of 1.7 and a HERMES 
estimate of 1.5. However, the results diverge sharply for 2010 and 2012. For 2010 
the HERMES estimate suggests that the budgetary stance was strongly 
contractionary at 1.9 per cent of GDP. The IMF estimate for 2010 is significantly 
lower at 1.2 per cent of GDP but it still estimates a strong contractionary fiscal 
stance. By contrast the Budget Book estimate suggests that the 2010 Budget had 
no effect on the structural deficit.  
 
FIGURE 6 Comparison with Official and IMF Estimates 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
A similar divergence emerges for 2012 with the HERMES and IMF estimates much 
closer than the European Commission figures. The Budget Book estimate of the 
change in the SBB for 2012 is estimated at just 0.4 per cent of GDP. This is very 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11  In each case we take the most recently published estimate of the SBB. The 2008 and 2009 estimates are from Budget 
2009, the 2010 estimate is from Budget 2010, the 2011 estimate from Budget 2011. The 2012 estimate is taken from 
Table A5 of the SPU, April 2012. 
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different to that estimated by the IMF which implies a change of 1.5 percentage 
points in the structural balance, much closer to the HERMES 1.8 estimate of fiscal 
stance.12  
 
4.4 Fiscal Policy is Predominantly Pro-cyclical 
Figure 7 shows our estimate of the fiscal stance from 1976 to 2012 cumulated 
over successive periods13 of expansionary or contractionary budgetary stance. 
The graph also shows the average annual growth rate in those periods. At first 
glance it is clear that fiscal policy has been broadly pro-cyclical throughout the 
last three and a half decades, with the exception of the years 1987-1989 when 
the government introduced a successful fiscal consolidation during a period of 
positive growth.  
 
The period 1977-1981 shows a cumulative expansionary effect, reflecting the 
strong expansion in current expenditure in that period. Following this, the 
budgets of the early and mid-1980s show up as mildly contractionary coupled 
with growth rates averaging just 0.7 per cent per annum. This was followed in the 
1987-1989 period by a period of very sharp fiscal adjustment which occurred at a 
time of a strong recovery in growth in the Irish economy.  
 
FIGURE 7 Fiscal Stance (LHS) and GDP Growth Rate (RHS), Annual Averages  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12  The Department of Finance have regularly expressed concerns that estimating the SBB using the EU common 
methodology is problematic for open economies such as Ireland. In the most recent 2012 Budget they again urged 
caution in interpreting the SBB figures. 
13  These periods are chosen to correspond to distinct periods of fiscal policy stance. See Barrett et al. (2009) for details. 
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During the 1990s, as growth began to take off, the average fiscal stance was 
mildly expansionary, accelerating in the period 1999-2002 which shows a 
significant expansionary fiscal stance. There was some fiscal retrenchment in 
2003-2004 following the dot-com recession before strong expansion in the years 
2005-2007. What is interesting about the 2005-2007 period is the similarity in the 
growth rate and the magnitude of the fiscal stance to the earlier 1977-1981 
period of expansion. By contrast, the subsequent fiscal consolidation of 2008-
2012 has been deeper than that estimated in the period 1982-1986 when very 
little progress was made ex post in discretionary budgetary adjustments.  In both 
cases, the austerity measures were introduced against a backdrop of low or 
negative growth and rapidly rising unemployment. The fiscal consolidation in the 
1980s was only successfully completed in the latter part of the decade during a 
re-emergence of strong growth in external demand which helped to offset the 
very sharp fiscal contraction of the years 1987-1989. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we present estimates of the fiscal stance based on an analysis of the 
fiscal consolidation budget packages introduced over the period 2008-2012. Our 
results suggest that the ex post effects of austerity were initially quite modest. In 
particular we find that the 2009 Budget was broadly neutral despite a very large 
package of cuts. In the years 2010 through to 2012, we estimate that fiscal policy 
has had a significant effect on the deficit, with a cumulative reduction in the 
structural deficit of over 5 ½ percentage points. 
 
While fiscal stance measures can be used to assess the likely expansionary or 
contractionary impact of budgetary policy on economic activity, they are silent on 
the appropriate stance of budgetary policy. Given the crisis that the Irish 
government faced in 2009 and 2010 with the precipitous collapse in its budget 
balance, the yawning pit of mounting bank losses all funded by the general 
government purse, and the sovereign’s eventual inability to independently raise 
funding on financial markets, there was little choice but to commence an 
aggressive fiscal consolidation programme to bring the public finances under 
control. This austerity programme, pursued over the past five years, which served 
initially to stabilise and more recently to reduce the deficit on the public finances, 
has occurred against a backdrop of a very deep recession in terms of output, 
employment and incomes. As in the 1980s, the Irish authorities find themselves 
once again in a position where they are pursuing an aggressive austerity 
programme against the tide, with a deeply pro-cyclical fiscal stance.  
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APPENDIX 1 The General Government Balance 2006-2012 
 
€million  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current receipts         
Taxes on income and wealth 19,945 20,904 19,231 16,651 16,143 18,642 19,925 
Social Insurance contribution 8,159 9,053 9,259 8,924 8,701 7,532 7,000 
Taxes on expenditure 24,666 25,216 22,246 18,271 17,922 17,678 18,375 
 Gross trading income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross rental income  536 568 676 495 535 524 475 
Investment income 1,239 1,615 2,172 1,979 2,167 2,044 2,400 
Transfers from ROW*  210 55 149 97 113 52 200 
Miscellaneous receipts  2,906 2,933 3,058 3,418 4,180 3,991 3,400 
Total receipts - current  57,661 60,345 56,792 49,835 49,759 50,464 51,775 
Capital receipts         
Taxes on capital   3,442 3,488 1,767 801 582 1,123 1,113 
Transfers from ROW 193 162 76 175 48 132 150 
Other receipts 1,930 2,369 1,766 628 200 171 108 
Total receipts - capital 5,566 6,019 3,609 1,604 831 1,426 1,371 
Total receipts  63,227 66,364 60,400 51,438 50,590 51,890 53,146 
Current expenditure         
 Subsidies  775 870 939 893 879 639 625 
National debt interest 1,828 1,957 2,376 3,246 4,937 5,143 6,450 
Transfer payments  20,390 23,180 26,214 28,317 27,859 28,319 27,671 
Goods and services:    26,813 29,530 31,167 30,273 28,026 27,111 27,149 
Wages,salaries and pensions           18,106 19,838 21,136 20,468 19,050 18,854 19,174 
 Other                                8,707 9,692 10,030 9,805 8,976 8,257 7,975 
Total current expenditure  49,806 55,537 60,695 62,729 61,701 61,213 61,896 
Capital expenditure         
 Grants to enterprises 593 823 2,046 4,844 32,160 6,060 725 
Recapitalisation of Financial 
Institutions    4,000 31,575 5,777   
 Other transfer payments  701 1,016 985 241 -375 364 550 
Gross physical capital formation      6,810 8,788 9,769 6,069 5,512 4,249 2,937 
 Payments to the rest of the world        105 35 31 18 27 27 50 
Total capital expenditure 8,209 10,662 12,830 11,173 37,325 10,701 4,262 
Total expenditure    58,014 66,198 73,525 73,901 99,025 71,913 66,158 
        
Net lending / net borrowing  5,212 166 -13,125 -22,463 -48,435 -20,023 -13,012 
General Government Balance 5,193 170 -13,129 -22,467 -48,426 -20,158 -13,012 
 
Source:  National Income and Expenditure 2011 Table 21 for 2006-2011. Stability Programme Update (SPU) April 2012 background tables 
for 2012 as supplied by Department of Finance. The data for 2012 are directly comparable with Table 21 in the National Accounts 
and are slightly different to the published data in Table A1 in the SPU. 
*ROW= Rest of World.  
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APPENDIX 2 Ex Ante Discretionary Measures 2008-2012 
 
Year Measure Source €bn 
2008 Expenditure July 2008 €1.0 
2009 Revenue Budget 2009 (Oct 2008) €2.0 
 Expenditure February 09 €2.1 
 - Tax revenue Supplementary Budget 2009 (Apr 2009) €3.5 
 - Current Expenditure Supplementary Budget 2009: Apr 2009 €1.2 
 - Capital Expenditure Supplementary Budget 2009: Apr 2009 €0.6 
2010 - Current Expenditure Budget 2010: Dec 2009 €3.3 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2010: Dec 2009 €1.0 
2011 - Current Expenditure Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €2.1 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €1.9 
 Tax revenue Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €1.4 
2012 - Current Expenditure Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €1.5 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €0.8 
 Tax revenue Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €1.6 
2008-
2012 
TOTAL  €23.9  
 
Source: For 2008-2010 Report of the Review Group on State Assets and Liabilities. [Table 2.1: Budgetary Adjustments since mid-2008 – 
 Planned Budgetary Impact.] For 2011 and 2012 Budget 2011, Budget 2012, Medium Term Fiscal Statement, November 2012 
 Table 2.1. The figures included show the full year effects, including carryover, and exclude once-off measures. 
 
 
 APPENDIX 3 Indexation Rules in Government Accounts in HERMES 
 
Item Indexation Rule 
REVENUE  
EXPENDITURE TAXES:  
  Excise Tax Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  VAT Previous year’s average tax rate 
 Carbon Taxes Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Stamp Duties, Fees, etc. Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  Motor Vehicle Duties-Companies Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  Customs Duties Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Rates Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
  Agricultural Levies Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in agricultural output prices 
  Contribution to EC Budget (-) Previous year’s contribution indexed to growth in OECD GDP 
TAXES ON INCOME:  
  Personal Income Tax Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Social Insurance Contributions Previous year’s average rate for both employee and employer 
  Company Taxes: Corporation Tax Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Motor Vehicle Duties-Personal Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to Personal consumption deflator 
  Farmers' Income Tax Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in agricultural incomes 
  DIRT Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in average deposit interest from GNP 
NON-TAX INCOME  
   Trading & Investment Income Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
   Transfers From Abroad Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
   Other Taxes Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
CAPITAL REVENUE Previous year’s level indexed to growth in GDP deflator 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE  
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION  
  Wage bill - Public Admin. Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
  Wage bill - Other Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
  Non-Pay Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
Subsidies  
 
 APPENDIX 3  Indexation Rules in Government Accounts in HERMES (Continued) 
 
Item Indexation Rule 
  Consumer Split in two: transport subsidies indexed to growth in output in transport and communications sector,  
other consumer subsidies indexed to growth in nominal consumption. 
  Other Subsidies  
      Agricultural Growth in gross output in agricultural sector 
      Non-agricultural subsidies Growth in nominal GDP at factor cost 
PERSONAL TRANSFERS  
  Unemployment Average rate indexed to either wages or prices (normally wages but in this paper prices) 
  Pensions etc. Previous year indexed to change in dependent population (under 14 and over 65) and  
growth in either wages or prices (in practice wages) 
Debt Interest  
Transfers to Rest of World Contribution to EU budget indexed to growth in OECD GDP;  
other government transfers indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE  
INVESTMENT  
  Housing Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Public Admin. Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Health & Education Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Other Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
CAPITAL TRANSFERS  
  to Industry Unchanged rate 
  to Households Unchanged rate 
Other Capital expenditure Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator (GDP deflator) 
 
*  The long-run volume growth rate in “normal times” is calculated as a nine-year centred moving average growth rate. This is intended to capture a measure of non-cyclical growth in each individual expenditure item, 
smoothing out cyclical changes.  
  
 
 
APPENDIX 4  Detailed HERMES Code Used for this Paper 
 
 Mnemonic Base Rate and Indexation Rule 
General Government Balance GBR=GTTOT+GR-GC-GK 
Total Current Revenue GTTOT  GTTOT=GTE+GTY+GTTI+GTTABR+GTW  
   Excise Tax GTEXT Personal Consumption volume (C), Tourism Exports volume (XTO) and 
the personal consumption deflator (PC) 
 Rate Indexed to PC 
   VAT GTEVAT C, PC, Private Housing  Investment (IHPV), Tourism Exports (XTOV) and 
Government Consumption of Goods and Services Non-Pay (GCGNPV) 
Rate Unchanged 
   Carbon Taxes GTECA Carbon Emissions (CO2)  Rate Unchanged 
   Stamp Duties, Fees, etc. GTEO C, PC, and Building Investment (IBV) Rate Indexed to PC 
   Motor Vehicle Duties-Companies GTEMVDC  Stock of Cars (SCARS) Indexed to PC 
   Customs Duties GTECUSO  Imports of Goods and Services (MGSV) Rate Unchanged 
   Rates GTERATE GNP in current prices (GNPV)  Indexed to GNPV 
   Agricultural Levies GTAGLEV Indexed to PQGA (Price deflator of Gross Agricultural Output) 
   Contribution to EC Budget (-) EECTG GNP Price deflator and OECD GDP (PGNP*GDP_OECD) Indexed to PGNP*GDP_OECD 
Total Taxes on Expenditure GTE GTE=GTEXT +GTEVAT + GTECA+GTEO+GTEMVDC+GTECUSO+GTERATE+GTAGLEV -EECTG 
   Personal Income Tax GTYPER Personal Disposable Income (YRPERT)  Rate Unchanged 
   Social Insurance Contributions GTYSL Wage Income (YWI + YWSM)  Rate Unchanged 
   Corporation Tax GTYC  Non-Wage Income (YC)  Rate Unchanged 
   Motor Vehicle Duties-Personal GTYMVDP  Stock of Cars (SCARS) Indexed to PC 
   Farmers' Income Tax GTYA Agricutlural Income (YAG)  Indexed to YAG 
   DIRT GTYDIRT  Indexed to RD*GNPV (RD=deposit interest rate) 
Total Taxes on Income GTY GTY=GTYPER+GTYSL+GTYC+GTYMVDP+GTYA+GTYDIRT 
Trading & Investment Income GTTI  Indexed to GNPV 
Transfers From Abroad GTTABR  Indexed to GNPV 
Other Taxes GTW  Indexed to GNPV 
Capital Revenue GR Indexed to GDP price deflator (PGDP)  
Current Expenditure: GC  GC=GCGV+SUB-EECS+GCTPER+GCTNT+GCTABR 
Public Consumption GCGV  GCGV=OSNPV+GCGOWV+GCGNPV  
  Wages - Public Admin. OSNPV Value added (OSNPV) equals wage bill (YWSNP)  
Wage bill (YWSNP) = Employment (LSNP) times Wage (WSNP)P 
 Index WSNP to average wages WNA; LSNP unchanged 
 
  
 APPENDIX 4  Detailed HERMES Code Used for this Paper (Continued)  
 Mnemonic Base Rate and Indexation Rule 
  Wages – Other GCGOWV GCGOWV=YWSNHE  
    Wages – Health and Education YWSNHE YWSNHE=LSNHE*WSNHE Index WSNHE to average wages WNA; LSNHE unchanged 
  Non-Pay GCGNPV Index to PGCGNP (price deflator) 
Subsidies GCS GCS=GCSC+GCSO  
  Consumer Subsidies GCSC GCSC=GCSCO+GCSCT  
     Transport GCSCT OSMTCV (Value added in Transport and Communications) Index to OSMTCV 
     Other    GCSCO Index to Personal Consumption (CV) 
  Other Subsidies GCSO GCSO=GCSA+GCSONA   
       Agricultural GCSA GCSA=GCSANS+GCSAS  
Sales GCSAS Gross Output in Agriculture (QGAV)  Index to QGAV 
Non-Sales GCSANS Gross Output in Agriculture (QGAV) Index to QGAV 
       Other Non-agricultural subsidies GCSONA GDP at factor cost in current prices (GDPFCV) Index to GDPFCV 
Personal Transfers GCTPER GCTPER=GCTU+GCTREST   
  Unemployment GCTU Unemployment (U)  Index to weighted average of WNA and PC1 
  Pensions etc. GCTREST Index population aged under 14 and over 65 to weighted average of WNA and PC 
Debt Interest GCTNT    
Transfers to Rest of World GCTABR GCTABR=GCTAEO+GCTAO  
   Non-tax contribution to EU budget GCTAEO GCTAEO = EECBUD-EECTG  
   Contribution to EU budget EECBUD PGNP*GDP_OECD Indexed to PGNP*GDP_OECD 
   Other govt transfers abroad GCTAO Indexed to GNPV 
Capital Expenditure GK GK=IHGV+ISNPV+ISNHEV+ISMGV+GKTI+GKTH+GKREST 
  Housing IHGV Index to PIH 
  Public Admin. ISNPV Index to PISNP 
  Health & Education ISNHEV Index to PISNHE 
  Other ISMGV Index to PISMG 
  Capital Transfers to Industry GKTI Total Industrial Investment (IIV)  Rate Unchanged 
  Capital Transfers to Households GKTH Private Housing Investment (IHPV)  Rate Unchanged 
Other Capital expenditure GKREST No Indexation, this is assumed unchanged 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  In the HERMES model there is an option to index unemployment transfer payments and other transfer payments (GCTREST) to either wages or prices or a weighted average of both. The default option is full 
 indexation to wages. 
 
 
 
 
 
